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vABSTRACT
Social Network Analysis (SNA) has been proposed as a tool to defeat
transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. However, SNA is a descriptive tool that
is a product of sociology and not an offensive tool used to attack a social network. SNA
was not designed to destabilize covert networks that are difficult to observe and
penetrate. This work presents a possible way to improve SNA’s performance against a
covert social network by employing the Computer Network Attack (CNA) model. The
CNA model is used by computer network security to represent the traditional approach to
hacking a computer network. Although not tested in this paper, it is argued that the CNA
model should be able to improve the accuracy of SNA when applied to a covert social
network by standardizing the destabilization process and allowing for frequent challenges
of operating assumptions.
A history and overview of both computer networks and social networks is covered
to allow for a comparison of the two networks. The networks have enough similarities to
allow the application of the CNA model without major modification from its original
form. Assumptions about the security of computer and social networks are examined to
clarify how the CNA model can attack a social network. The model is examined for
validity and the conclusion is that the CNA model can incorporate SNA into a more
methodical approach to achieve better results that using SNA alone. The final portion of
the paper details a possible implementation of the CNA model and how it can be used as
part of an offensive effort to destabilize a covert social network.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PAPER
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is used by sociologists to measure and to
understand the social networks that develop when people interact. The study of social
networks has been part of sociology since the mid-1950s, and SNA has evolved and
solidified slowly in the past fifty years. Recently, world events have thrust SNA into the
spotlight. The Global War on Terror and the post 9-11 security environment have
focused a great deal of attention on alternative uses for SNA. Global terrorist
organizations such as Al Qaeda are organized into structures that are typical, fragmented
social networks. The recent attention on SNA is centered on what it can bring to bear in
defeating a terrorist group such as Al Qaeda, and what possibilities may exist in using
SNA as an offensive measure to destabilize a network instead of an academic tool used
solely to understand a network’s relationships.
One of the hurdles to SNA making the change from academic device to
operational asset is that SNA has yet to experience the growth and refinement customary
for accepted use of an analytical tool. The standardization and predictability necessary
for employment by forces battling a covert network does not exist. SNA is being used to
fight covert networks, but its use is limited to improving situational awareness instead of
integrating intelligence, analysis, and targeting to meet strategic objectives in defeating
covert social networks.
If we wish to use SNA in the context of offensive operations, then it must be
standardized into an offensive framework. A framework already in use is the CNA
(Computer Network Attack) model created in computer network security to model
computer hacking. The model is based on four stages that a typical computer “hacker”
progresses through to penetrate a computer network: footprinting; scanning;
enumeration; and exploitation. Each stage is offensive, builds on the previous stages, and
is geared towards a clandestine penetration of a network. The analogy between using
SNA to penetrate a social network and using the CNA model to exploit a computer
network appears rather intuitive. However, to take the CNA model from analogy to a
2viable method for improving SNA requires careful examination, and that is the purpose
of this paper: to determine if the CNA model can improve SNA applied to a covert social
network, and exactly how applicable the model is to destabilizing a covert network.
B. MEETING THE OBJECTIVE
Multiple assumptions must be challenged and verified before the CNA model can
be evaluated. The first is that social networks and SNA will be examined to ensure that
there is a clear understanding of what they are and how they operate. Just with any skill-
set or tool, SNA comes with its own terminology and metrics. Only a basic introduction
will be covered here, but enough to ensure that the reader understands how SNA is
applied.
Once SNA is understood in a benign setting, the challenges of applying it to a
covert social network will be detailed to allow for a later comparison with the CNA
model. Current research in this area will be examined to highlight some of the issues of
using SNA against a covert network. SNA is a descriptive tool designed to describe the
relationships in a social network with various methods such as a graph or a matrix.
However, SNA runs into many problems with data accuracy when facing a network that
wishes to remain on the fringes of society. The analyst cannot survey the network
members for their relationships, and historical records are of questionable accuracy.
Therefore, SNA must make several assumptions when analyzing a network. These
assumptions are potential sources of error in the final network analysis. Each assumption
will be examined to determine how the CNA model can improve its accuracy.
After exploring social networks, computer networks and their operations are
examined. Computer networks handle their communications using set protocols and
procedures that are designed for reliability and predictability. There are only a few
possible arrangements of computers in a network topology and they are normally
configured by convention using a best-practices approach. Computer networks have a
separate field of Network Security filled with professionals that keep networks safe and
hackers out. The way that computer networks are secured is important to understanding
how the CNA model is applied against computers.
3Once social networks and computer networks are examined separately, they will
be compared against one another. Social networks are composed of people that are
inherently complex and unpredictable when compared to the computers in a computer
network. Computer networks are established and organized in predictable ways
following standardized guidelines. The two networks are similar in many ways, but are
also different in an equal number of ways. The two different networks create a need to
test the underlying assumption that applying the CNA model to a covert social network is
possible. This assumption will be tested to determine if the CNA model needs to be
modified, or if the model is applicable in its original form.
After the CNA model has demonstrated some validity in its application to covert
social networks, the paper will question is ability to improve SNA. This is necessary
because the model can be applicable, but still not improve SNA in any way. When using
the CNA model, SNA will form a subset of a more complete process. In this way, it
should improve the accuracy of SNA and ensure more reliable results from the analysis.
Finally, the paper will conclude by merging the CNA model with SNA to demonstrate
how the two can be intertwined to fight a covert network.
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5II. SOCIAL NETWORKS, COVERT NETWORKS, AND SOCIAL
NETWORK ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
Since 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism, the analysis of social networks has
become a subject of great interest. The attacks on the World Trade Center focused the
public’s attention on transnational terrorists groups like Al Qaeda. The need to
understand and map terrorist networks requires unorthodox thinking. Fighting terrorist
networks that are often organized into disjointed cells can present a challenge for even
the most experienced military or law enforcement investigator. The study of social
networks and Social Network Analysis (SNA) have emerged as a potential tool to aid in
the pursuit and neutralization of terrorists. To understand the potential and limitations of
social networks, it is necessary to examine what a social network is and is not, but also
how SNA can be used to model and disrupt covert social networks.
B. SOCIAL NETWORKS
Social networks can be divided into two components: a social component and a
network component. In general, when referring to social networks, the social component
is the existence of some relationship between two or more people, places, or events. It
could be a friendship, club membership, school, or any other connection that unites the
members in some social relationship. The second component, the network, is the
grouping of the people, places, or events into an interconnected organization that has no
formal or hierarchal construction. The network is characterized by a flat organization of
interconnected members in which most member have equal status or rank. Formally, a
social network is defined as: “a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations
defined on them” (Wasserman and Faust, 20).
Even when formally stated, the definition in practice varies greatly from
researcher to researcher, and the term is often used loosely. However, interconnection, a
lack of formal structure, and relative equality among members are the common
characteristics. It is also important to note that some authors draw a distinction between a
network and the “flat organization” with only a few leaders who exercise control over a
6number of subordinates of the same status or rank (Fukuyama and Shulsky, 1997). This
distinction will not be drawn here. Networks and flat organizations will be treated as one
and the same.
C. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (SNA)
1. The Motivation behind SNA
SNA is the study of social networks. Studying social networks requires a separate
approach from traditional sociological methods. Traditional sociology focuses on the
actor and how the actor’s attributes (race, gender, ethnicity, etc.) affect the data in
question (Degenne and Forse, 1). However, when examining social networks, the
attributes of the actor are secondary to the connections between the members of the
network. Sociologists were forced to adapt their thinking to study the interconnection of
people instead of studying people when they are interconnected. The difference may
appear subtle, but it is not. The focus is on the relationship instead of the people in the
relationship. This change of focus lead to the merging of network theory from other
fields, such as mathematics, with accepted practices from sociology. The result of this
merger was Social Network Analysis.
There are two major characteristics that are unique to SNA. The first is that SNA
focuses on the relationships amongst the network members. The second characteristic is
that the actors are assumed to be interdependent instead of independent (Wasserman and
Faust, 4). As they are interdependent, metrics are compared against the network or
portions of the network. Individual members of the network may be compared to one
another, but the metrics used to compare the nodes will derive their value from
comparison against the network as a whole. For example, one node may be more
connected than another node, but the metric of connectivity takes on meaning because it
measures how a single node relates to the entire network. Individual properties of nodes
(race, gender, etc.) are not the primary concern.
2. Terminology
SNA comes with a long vernacular that is varied and colorful. There are often
multiple terms that refer to the same concept, and these differing terms can lead to
confusion. Establishing a few terms is necessary to standardize a common vocabulary.
Actors or Nodes refer to the members of a social network. Some social networks measure
7the relationships between people (e.g., friendship) and others measure the relationship
between people and some common event or location (e.g., organization membership or
party attendance). Tie is used interchangeably with relationship to express the shared
bond among actors or nodes.
The term mode is frequently encountered in SNA. The concept of a mode is easy
to understand, but can be difficult to explain. Wasserman and Faust define mode as: “a
distinct set of entities on which the structural variables are measured.” (29) Mode refers
to the “set” of actors. If all the actors come from the same set (group, religion, party,
school, etc.), then it is a one mode network. If the set of actors come from two different
groups (two different political parties, groups, teams, etc.) then it is a two mode network.
Note that an actor/node can be an event or a location. If a group of people are meeting at
a location, it would be a two mode network. The first mode is the group of people and
second is the location or the meeting itself. Any number of modes beyond two is
generally referred to as a multimode.
3. Matrices and Graphs
SNA’s greatest potential lies with its ability to display relational data. This is
most commonly done as a sociomatrix or as a sociogram. Both sociograms and
sociomatrices have been in use since the 1930s and are a product of the science of
sociometry which studies affective relations among actors such as like/dislike or
love/hate (Wasserman and Faust, 77). The more advanced concepts of SNA derive their
methods and importance from the use of either a sociomatrix or a sociogram.
A sociomatrix is a matrix that shows the relationships among different actors.
Each axis of the matrix contains the actors/nodes in the network. The cells of the matrix
show the relationship between the actors. Common coding schemes are binary and
valued. Binary coding is used to show that a relationship exists (1) or a relationship does
not exist (0). Valued coding is used to show different degrees of relationships such as
acquaintance (1), friend (2), or best friend (3). Table 1 below provides an example of a
two mode binary sociomatrix and reflects who attended a party thrown by Jim. Table 1
also shows a one mode, valued sociomatrix that reflects the friendship coding scheme
mentioned above.
8Jim's Party Mike Bob Jen Tim Deb
Mike 1 Mike - 2 2 3 2
Bob 0 Bob 2 - 1 2 1
Jen 1 Jen 2 1 - 2 2
Tim 1 Tim 3 2 2 - 2
Deb 0 Deb 2 1 2 2 -
Two mode, binary One mode, valued
Table 1. Examples of SNA Coding Schemes
Sociograms improve visualization of network composition and the arrangement of
actors. They are most often graphs composed of actors/nodes represented as points that
are connected to one another by lines that represent relationships/ties. Most frequently,
sociograms use sociomatrices as their input data. The data from the matrix become the
coordinates in a Cartesian plane, or more simply, the matrix data becomes the X and Y
coordinates for the sociogram when plotted. Below is an example of sociograms created
in the NETDRAW software package:
Figure 1. Two Mode, Directed Sociogram
The sociogram above displays directed relationships. Sociograms can be drawn
as directional or as non-directional. The difference is that directional sociograms use
arrows to indicate the direction of relationships between nodes. This is useful for
indicating relationships such as like and dislike, or more relevant to covert networks,
9which actors are supplying other actors or which actors seek information from other
actors. Non-directional ties are used in situations where there is no need to denote choice
or affective relationships. For example, a sociogram displaying the membership of a
drug cartel would use simple lines instead of arrows to connect nodes, as membership is
an absolute metric without a need to indicate direction.
Often analysts will break a sociogram into smaller pieces to prove a point or to
highlight a unique characteristic of a relationship. There are three general levels of data
that can be analyzed and are often referred to as the “modeling unit” (Wasserman and
Faust, 44). The first modeling unit is the dyad which is the grouping of only two nodes.
The second level or modeling unit is the triad which is the collection of three nodes. The
final modeling unit is the subgroup or subnetwork. A subgroup is a collection of nodes
that can range from two nodes to one node less than the original graph. Modeling units
are necessary for discussing network patterns and metrics and are an important part of
applying SNA.
4. Data Collection and Measurement
Social network data is traditionally collected by interacting with network actors or
observing their relationships. Surveys, questionnaires, observation, and experiments are
the methods normally used. However, when there is no way to interact with the actors or
to gain access for observation, as in a terrorist organization, analysts must use archival
data or public records to assemble the social network. A classic example of using public
records to construct a social network was the reconstruction of the September 11th
hijackers by Valdis Krebs in his “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells.” Krebs used
information from major newspapers, released data about the relationships amongst the
hijackers from law enforcement agencies, and Internet search engines to determine how
the network interacted. Krebs’s study is proof that social network data collection can
require creativity when the actors are not accessible. Data collection and manipulation
requires careful definitions and qualifications to prevent a study from sliding from logical
conclusion into conjecture or presumption.
Social network metrics are always measures that compare a node or a tie to the
other nodes and ties in the network. To study relationships the collected data cannot be
viewed in isolation, and it only takes on meaning when it is viewed in relation to the
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larger dyad, triad, subnetwork, or the network as a whole. For example, a SNA metric is
centrality. Centrality comes in different forms such as degree centrality which is the
number of connections to other actors or betweenness centrality which is a measure of
how many ties pass through an actor. In general, those nodes that form hubs of the
network are considered central. Researchers intuitively understand the concept and have
also found it “difficult to quantify,” but agree that power concentrates with central actors
(Degenne and Forse, 132). Centrality relates an actor to the other nodes in the network.
The fact that SNA metrics are only of value when compared to a larger network is
important to understanding what a social network analyst is attempting to prove and also
to understanding what assumptions, errors, and mistakes may have occurred in data
collection or processing.
In summary, Wasserman and Faust in their classic book, Social Network Analysis,
provide an excellent overview of SNA:
Given a collection of actors, social network analysis can be used to study
the structural variables measured on actors in the set. The relational
structure of a group or larger social systems consists of the pattern of
relationships among the collection of actors. The concept of a network
emphasizes the fact that each individual has ties to other individuals, each
of whom in turn is tied to a few, some, or many others, and so on. The
phrase “social network” refers to the set of actors and the ties among them.
The network analyst would seek to model these relationships to depict the
structure of a group. One could then study the impact of this structure on
individuals within the group. (9)
5. Patterns and SNA
Of great importance to SNA is the central role that patterns play in understanding
a social network. What is apparent in the summary of SNA provided by Wasserman and
Faust is that patterns are the key component that turns raw data into useful information.
They refer to the emergence of patterns as structure, and point out that the analyst must
model this structure to understand the network and gather useful information such as
composition, organization, or roles.
The single key that makes SNA plausible and useful is that interacting people
form patterns. SNA reverses the interaction of people to determine why a network exists
in its present form. People meet one another and then based on some rationale (i.e.
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shared interests, sense of humor, etc.) they form patterns of interaction (i.e. seeking
advice from the same people, eating lunch with the same group, etc.). SNA reverses the
process by modeling the interactions between people to determine a pattern, and then
determines why the actors created these patterns.
Network analysts assume that there is always a pattern; otherwise the network
cannot be studied. A pattern is something interesting that emerges amongst the
connections of nodes with links in either a matrix or a graph. Within the connections,
some nodes will pique the interest of the analyst because they are more connected, more
central, or for some other reason. The descriptive capability of SNA helps an analyst find
a pattern. Without a pattern, there would be no network to study. The challenge for the
analyst is to keep working with the data and to change the model, also known as
permutation, until a pattern emerges. Therefore, pattern recognition and pattern
interpretation are the two pillars of successful SNA. Once the pattern is found (pattern
recognition) the analyst can then determine how to change the network (pattern
interpretation) to obtain the desired effects.
D. SNA AND DISRUPTING COVERT NETWORKS
SNA is traditionally used to understand sociological questions about friendships,
work relationships, and other common, everyday applications where actors organize into
informal relationships. However, recently the idea of using SNA to track and disrupt
terrorist networks has gained traction. In fact, the newly released joint U.S. Army and
U.S. Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, includes an appendix that
addresses the basics of SNA (E-10).
SNA has the potential to be a powerful tool for tracking and identifying obscure
patterns in a terrorist or criminal network, but its applications are limited. SNA can only
provide the analyst or warfighter another way to describe the enemy’s organization. SNA
cannot topple Al Qaeda and it cannot bring a terrorist network to its knees. Current
efforts to use SNA as a destabilizing force lack depth and structure. In general, SNA is
too immature to be actively used in the way some researches are proposing, and is forced
to remain as a useful tool for improving the commander’s situational awareness and
understanding of an enemy network.
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For the sake of clarity, in the discussion that follows “covert networks” or “covert
social networks” are defined as networks that engage in illegal activity and attempt to
operate clandestinely. Other authors have used the same criteria to define “dark” and
“light” networks (Rabb and Milward, 415).
E. THE CHALLENGE OF COVERT NETWORKS
SNA is normally used in a benign manner to track social networks. Its methods
and techniques encounter major challenges that require some rather drastic changes when
applied to covert social networks. The fact that covert networks operate with utmost
secrecy and are organized to resist detection or penetrations are major obstacles for the
analyst applying SNA. Although these challenges are not only faced by SNA, but also by
any analytical study of a covert network, SNA’s ability to describe the network in
question is severely hampered when studying a covert network. Data collection, data
accuracy, and pattern detection all differ from traditional SNA.
Terrorist networks’ survival is directly proportional to secrecy. Skilled terrorist
groups organize into cells to prevent discovery and limit damage if cells are captured by
authorities. Traditional data collection methods like surveys and interviews are not
applicable to terrorist networks for obvious reasons. SNA must fight against this secrecy
to determine which actors are part of the network and what roles they fill. Analysts are
forced to rely on intelligence reports, interrogations, and logical deduction as well as
educated guessing to gather network data. Invariably, this leads to errors. Some actors
may escape detection and other nodes will wrongly be assigned roles and positions to
compensate. The model network structure may or may not accurately reflect the actual
terrorist network. There is no way for the analyst to know how accurate the model is. It
cannot be overstated that every sociogram and sociomatrix is nothing more than an
educated guess with varying degrees of probabilistic certainty.
SNA also faces a constantly changing data set. Every day, new information is
collected while counter-terrorist and counterinsurgency efforts are ongoing. The analyst
must be able to quickly modify the network model to reflect new data. Not only is data
constantly changing, the covert network is also continuously adapting. Nodes are added
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and removed, change position, and change importance as the network operates. This
produces yet more error in the model network. Covert social networks can change so
quickly, that by the time the network data is gathered, the actual network may have
changed drastically. Overt networks also change rapidly, but the openness of the network
should allow the analyst the ability to adjust his data and models much more quickly that
changes in a covert social network. Frequently studies of covert networks are well after
the fact and are used for illustrative purposes instead of attempting to actually destabilize
standing networks.
Krebs found in his study of the September 11th hijacking that he faced the
“inevitable” problems of network adaptability and data completeness (44). There is no
way to overcome these challenges. As their effects cannot be removed, they must be
mitigated. It falls to the analyst to ensure that the data set is as complete as possible, but
also to determine a good faith estimate of how accurate the data is. SNA can be applied
to covert networks, but it must be done carefully and with a great deal of respect for its
limitations.
F. CURRENT RESEARCH ON DESTABILIZATION
Researchers that are applying SNA and network analysis to covert networks are
few in number. Krebs and the 9/11 study have already been mentioned. Jonathan Farley
examined the Al Qaeda network from a mathematical point of view (Farley, 2003).
However, the most prolific writer and researcher has been Professor Kathleen Carley at
Carnegie Melon University. She has written numerous papers on mapping, destabilizing,
and understanding covert networks. She has been writing about networks for just shy of
two decades, and the fact that she frequently sites her own work is indicative of the lack
of research in applying SNA to covert networks. Unfortunately, Carley has focused more
on developing software and methods to compare destabilization strategies than actually
proposing how SNA can be used to fight a covert network.
Carley’s papers have repeatedly presented the same strategy for destabilization
(Carley, 2001, 2003, 2006). Her strategy is to add or remove nodes, but the focus is on
removal. This is also the strategy proposed by Farley. A node is targeted using SNA and
her evolution of SNA termed Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA). SNA and DNA will
be treated as the same tool. Although she proposes that DNA is different from SNA,
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from her papers it appears that DNA is nothing more than software and computer
processing applied to SNA. However, according to Carley:
Dynamic network analysis (DNA) combines social network, statistical
link analysis, machine learning, artificial intelligence and computer
simulation techniques to create systems for estimating the size, shape
(Dombroski et al., 2003), vulnerabilities, key actors and dynamics of
relational data (Carley, 1999) connecting various entities including people,
resources, actions and locations (Carley 2006, 54).
Carley (2006) brings together all of her previous work into one document and
specifically addresses covert networks. Nodes are targeted for removal based upon their
centrality, possession of a unique skill (such as a bombmaking), or their high “cognitive
demand” which is requirement for an “emergent leader” (Carley 2006, 56). Carley points
to her earlier work to explain that emergent leaders are those nodes that display high
“cognitive load” and are worthy of targeting.
Overall cognitive load, not simply structural power, is key to tracking who
is likely to be the emergent leader. Based on these considerations, we
define the emergent leader as the individual with the highest cognitive
load (the most people to talk to, the most information to process, the most
tasks to do, the hardest tasks to do, the most people to negotiate with to get
the job done, etc.)…Consequently, emergent leaders, by virtue of their
centrality across the entire meta-network are good candidate agents to
remove if the goal is to destabilize the network (Carley 2001, 84).
Once these nodes are removed, Carley argues, the network will suffer from
“cascading errors” that will reduce the network’s ability to function. Unfortunately,
Carley (2006) does not use a real world example to prove her case, but instead uses a
greatly simplified, virtual experiment conducted with software to isolate nodes in a
network in succession. She compared random networks and cellular networks and also
compared the results of isolating emergent leader nodes, central nodes, and random
nodes. Her conclusions from the experiment are that cellular networks are more
susceptible to nodal isolation or what she terms an “attrition strategy” than random
networks and “The results also indicate that for cellular networks they can be destabilized
best, in the short run, by isolating those individual’s [sic] who are emergent leaders”
(Carley 2006, 66).
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Carley (2006) presents some interesting thoughts, but also gives cursory mention
to the challenges that SNA faces when used against covert networks. To employ a
strategy of nodal removal, the structure of the network must be known. Determining who
to remove requires quite a bit of intelligence. The reality of fighting covert networks is
that this information is often not available due to the covert network’s secrecy and rapid
adaptation. In a protracted destabilization effort, the required information may be
gathered and applied, but nodal removal is a simplistic approach to destabilization. The
United States has been targeting Osama bin Laden for over five years and has been
unable to remove this node. It is debatable how central he his to Al Qaeda’s operations,
but the point remains that nodal removal is not as easy in practice.
The repetition of nodal removal is not the only example of researchers making
simplifying assumptions that neglect the reality of fighting covert networks. SNA
functions on pattern recognition and pattern interpretation. The detection of patterns in
the past is easy as the data is known, and often prior patterns can provide insights to the
future. Krebs study of the 9/11 hijackers was successful because it occurred after the
fact, and is useful for understanding how the network organized and operated. His study
is not directly applicable to the future and it certainly cannot be assumed that the next
attack on America will operate in the same way as the 9/11 network. SNA must use
known terrorist networks to demonstrate its abilities against covert networks. However,
this trend also induces an inherent focus on the past. The regularity that is required for
pattern detection is difficult to obtain in an operating covert network. Even with the
possible errors that arise when applying SNA to covert networks
and the challenges of data integrity outlined previously, SNA is not a predictive tool and
attempting to use it as such discounts too many variables to give results any degree of
validity.
G. WHAT SNA IS MISSING
SNA may become an important operational tool as the Global War on Terrorism
remains a major component of the National Security Strategy. The fact that recently
published counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, includes SNA is proof that there is belief
in the merit of its application. However, the current state of research in SNA and its use
against covert networks presents serious questions about its applicability and utility. The
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problems with data collection have already been covered in detail. It is understandable
why SNA is met with skepticism, and SNA must overcome these limitations and address
what is missing if its benefits are to be realized.
Destabilization strategies should include more than nodal removal. The absence
of other presented strategies is disconcerting, especially when law enforcement and
intelligence agencies have been practicing SNA, although in less codified form, since its
inception. Nodes can be neutralized by killing or kidnapping them as Carley (2001,
2003, and 2006) and Farley (2003) suggest, but they can also be manipulated. Carley
discusses adding nodes to a network, but dismisses it as being impractical and “a perilous
and slow strategy” (Carley, Destabilization 58). Adding nodes is difficult, but it should
not be dismissed because it is not a quick solution to network destabilization.
Additionally, current research neglects that the manipulation of covert networks can often
produce more desirable and predictable results than attempting to fragment the network
or causing “cascading errors” using nodal removal.
Leaving actors in place presents opportunities to turn them into agents for friendly
forces. Intelligence agencies have perfected this to an art, and their art form is ideal for
manipulating the relationships between actors. Although recruiting and running agents is
a complex endeavor, even basic tradecraft such as appealing to any of the Seven Deadly
Sins (greed, lust, pride, etc.) should produce benefits. Unreachable nodes can be
accessed by using more exposed nodes and turning them into agents. As well, the
primary goal of any analyst should be to obtain as much information as possible in order
to create the best possible match between the model network and the actual network.
Leaving nodes in place allows information about the network to expand and the
probability of error decreases as actors are under surveillance.
The information that is passed between actors can be manipulated to draw
suspicion or to create confusion. False information spread with a careful touch can create
rumors and distrust to manipulate the network. For example, planting information that an
actor is meeting with friendly forces can deteriorate the trust that exists in the network
ties. An appealing aspect of this strategy is that the other members of the network may
move from suspicion into action and possibly neutralize a node that cannot be reached by
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friendly forces. These are only two alternatives to nodal removal and future research
should focus on other options.
The options for network manipulation are only limited by the creativity of the
analyst and the operational forces employing SNA. SNA shows the analyst the patterns
in the network and nothing more. SNA will not present the best possible method to
destabilize the network, it is a descriptive tool and it can only show the network’s
structure and the patterns that can be destabilized or manipulated. Often proponents of
SNA will forget the fact that SNA is primarily a tool for analysis and when applied for
forecasting or prediction it quickly builds up errors that leave it little more than
guesswork.
1. A Systematic Process
The lack of alternative destabilization strategies points to the lack of structure or
formal process in applying SNA to covert networks. While research is lacking on the
whole, no formal, systematic process exists for attacking and defeating covert networks.
Using a systematic approach allows all users to examine data collection and proposed
strategies from start to finish. A formal process would help increase the confidence level
of model networks because analysts would all use the same procedure to map a network.
Analysts not involved with the original study could examine the network analysis and
quickly determine where assumptions were made and if the assumptions were reasonable.
The potential for collaboration among analysts will certainly produce more accurate and
reliable network models.
Instead of creating a process for attacking a covert network, it is more efficient to
apply a process that already exists. This process exists in computer networks and
Computer Network Attack (CNA). A systematic process exists for identifying the
network structure, properties of a node, and vulnerabilities for exploitation. Exploiting
the covert network still requires the creativity of the analyst, but adopting the process can
help standardize SNA. The goal is to increase the confidence level of models and
eventually lead to more successful destabilization efforts against covert networks.
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III. COMPUTER NETWORKS, NETWORK SECURITY, AND
COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK
A. INTRODUCTION
Most people have an intuitive understanding for of social networks. Friends,
family, and coworkers are only a few of the thousands of possible networks that exist for
every member of society. These networks serve as personal experience and are the basis
for intuitive understanding. What is not necessarily intuitive to the average person is the
way that computer networks are structured and how they operate. As will emerge in this
chapter, there are many similarities between computer networks and social networks.
The utility of these similarities will be explored in the next chapter, but this chapter aims
to explore computer networks and the Computer Network Attack (CNA) model. The
purpose is to enable a comparison between social networks and computer networks, and
to highlight the benefits that CNA can bring to Social Network Analysis (SNA).
Before understanding the CNA process and framework, it is necessary to
understand the way computers communicate, are arranged into networks, and how
computer networks are secured. There are formal rules and guidelines that cover the
interconnection and communication of computers. These rules and standards were
designed for simple and reliable operation in order to meet the needs of legitimate users.
However, these standards were not designed to stop, or even prevent, the abuse of a
network by malicious users. “Hackers” and “crackers” are often used to describe those
that find holes in the standards of communication and abuse their weaknesses for
personal gain. The field of Network Security has responded to hackers’ efforts to
undermine the safe and secure operation of computer networks by evolving into an
established, professional field. This evolution has prompted professionals to develop a
formal model of hackers’ approach to attacking a computer network. This model is the




1. Characteristics, Operation, and Standardization
The first requirements for successful communication between two or more
computers are standardization and openness. The means by which a computer transmits
and receives data must be known by all other computers on the network. The process
must also be done in a standard way. Whatever process is used by one machine must be
used by other machines, or at a minimum, it must be known by other machines so that the
process can be reversed to regain the data in question. For example, if a computer sends
an email message by breaking it into ten equal sections, numbering them sequentially,
and sending each piece individually, the receiving computer must know to look for ten
sections, to place them in the proper order, and then display the information to the user.
If the process was done differently by each user or was done in a secret way, other users
would be faced with an influx of data devoid of meaning or structure. It is the same thing
as two people attempting to communicate by speaking languages that they personally
created. It simply will not work. There have to be known rules for how information is
structured and passed between users.
Actual computer networks communicate with standardized processes that are
formalized by different regulatory bodies. Although computer networks can be managed
in any way by any user, to prevent confusion and possible damage, these groups act as
the central reference for operating procedures. This prevents new technologies from
conflicting with existing ones. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) are a few of the major players in the standardization of computer
networks.
These organizations decide the best way to deal with various questions such as:
how data will be split apart and reassembled, which addresses can be used by different
computers on the network and the proper format for those addresses. They deal with very
basic questions about voltages and types of cables or connectors used to link computers.
This standardization is a major hurdle for different technologies reaching mainstream
usage. A government or private corporation may develop its own special software, but to
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gain widespread use it may be modified to meet the standardization guidelines. In its
original, proprietary format, software often prevents its incorporation into other
applications. Once standardized, developers and customers know what to expect in terms
of performance, interfaces, and other factors as all future instances of the software or
technology will meet the assigned standards. Standardization allows technologies to take
off and achieve the primary goal of generating income.
At the most general levels, computer networking follows a model created by the
International Standards Organization (ISO) (Figure 2). This model is the Open Standards
Interconnection Model, but is commonly referred to as the OSI Reference Model. The
model itself has seven “layers” that represent a necessary step in the process of taking
human communication (written, spoken, or visual) and reducing it to a machine usable
format.
Figure 2. ISO Reference Model
(From: www.dell.com, Jan 16, 2007)
The important point about this model is that it is the definitive cornerstone of
computer network communication. The OSI model is also extremely general. Real
network communications can combine layers or modify the layers of the OSI model. As
technologies emerge and mature, their respective developers will seek to innovate and
will develop their own models that are similar to the OSI model. However, every
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instance of computer intercommunication must incorporate all of the seven layers in
some way. When different agencies and organizations create their own answer to
fulfilling the requirements of the OSI model their solution is generally known as a
protocol suite. A protocol is “a set of rules and formats that enables the standardized
exchange of information between different systems” (Harris, 964). A suite is the
collection of different protocols that are used in conjunction to meet the requirements set
forth by the OSI model.
Without a doubt, the most common protocol suite is the Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite (Goleniewski, 247). This suite is the
foundation of the world wide Internet. The TCP/IP suite or “stack” was developed by the
Department of Defense with the precursor of the Internet known as ARPANET. TCP is
the protocol that handles the setup of connections, error control and correction, and is the
“protocol for sequenced and reliable data transfer” (Goleniewski, 248). TCP functions as
the intelligence in the suite, but IP is the workhorse of TCP/IP. IP handles basic
functions such as breaking the data into smaller and more manageable sized units called
“packets” or “datagrams,” ensures packets are a set size with correct formatting and
sequencing, and generally “handles packet forwarding and transporting of datagrams
across a network” (Goleniewski, 248). TCP and IP are the means by which computer
networks share information. There are other suites, but the TCP/IP suite is the dominant
suite by far.
TCP/IP does not follow the ISO model exactly. There is a separate TCP/IP
model, but it incorporates all of the layers of the ISO model. Communication for the ISO
model or the TCP/IP model depends on the process of encapsulation. At a basic level,
encapsulation is the process where data is broken into packets and information is added to
the data as it proceeds down through the layers of the ISO or TCP/IP model. Each layer
takes the previous layers’ information and adds its necessary data to the outside of the
packets. The layers are responsible for telling the network necessary information like
who should receive the packet, what kind of information the packet contains, and how the
receiving computer should reassemble the packets. The receiving computer reverses the
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encapsulation to remove the required information from the outside of the packets,
working its way to the original data, as the packet proceeds up through the layers of the
model.
Defined as standard by the TCP protocol, each computer has 65,536 or 216
possible “ports” that act as avenues of communication. Each port is akin to a door that
the computer can communicate through to reach other computers. There is nothing that
requires each port to be assigned to a protocol, but the IANA and accepted convention
have firmly set many of the lower number ports. For example, Internet traffic such as
web pages normally communicates on port 80. This allows any user desiring to
determine if a machine has a web page up and running to examine port 80. If port 80 is
“open,” it implies that there is a webpage open for access.
Computer networks communicate based on the ISO model primarily using
TCP/IP and defined ports to transfer information. However, one final characteristic is
important to note. Computer networks can operate in two different modes: synchronous
and asynchronous. In synchronous communication, the communicating computers are
coordinating their transfer in some manner. Frequently, this synchronization is done via
timing and special packets. Without coordination between the networked computers,
they could not carry on a simultaneous conversation with one another because they could
attempt to communicate at the same time and create conflicts on the network.
Asynchronous networks are used for functions where only one computer will
communicate at a time, such as broadcast traffic. Synchronous networks are more useful,
but they are also more complex and present more opportunities for abuse.
2. Internetworking and the Internet
Computer networks can vary in size from two computers to an infinite number of
machines. The size of the network will dictate the types of hardware and software used
to communicate. A network that is designed for a small business of five users is vastly
different from a business network used by hundreds of employees in different parts of the
world. Connecting different computer networks into larger networks creates what is
known as an internetwork or an internet. The largest example of the interconnection of
networks is the global Internet that has become an integral part of daily life. Whether a
small network or the Internet, when discussing computer networks the scale of the
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network must be stated and understood as characteristics and conclusions drawn at one
level may not be applicable to networks of different sizes.
There are two categories that are used to describe computer networks. There are
more technical methods of division, but the categories are based on the geographic areas
that they encompass. The first is the Local Area Network or LAN. LANs normally span
a small area such as a campus or a single building. A university network is a classic
example of a LAN. The second category is the Wide Area Network or WAN. WANs
normally span multiple installations spread across greater distances such as counties,
states, or countries. Using the university network again as a baseline, a WAN would be
the interconnection of multiple university networks. WANs can be unlimited in size.
The global Internet is an example of a WAN spanning the entire world.
WANs and the Internet have become areas of interesting research in recent years.
This is an example of how LANs and WANs differ and why scale cannot be ignored
when discussing computer networks. WANs are the subject of research instead of LANs
because as networks grow in size, they also lose the unified oversight that can limit
growth and expansion. Instead of a single organization having total control over the
network, the involved networks must work in cooperation and with more permissive
guidelines. These characteristics have allowed the explosive growth of the Internet and
are the reason that researchers such as Albert-Laszlo Barbarasi have used the Internet to
model virus growth, biology, social networks, economics, and other areas that
incorporate network theory. Barbarasi found that the Internet has gown to the point that
is almost is its own separate entity, “While entirely of human design, the Internet now
lives life of its own. It has all the characteristics of a complex evolving system, making it
more similar to a cell that to a computer chip” (Barabasi, Linked, 149). Barbarasi
understands that the Internet is a collection of inter-networked computers and computers
only do what they are told, but his point is that the Internet’s rapid growth and expansion
parallel other natural processes such as cellular growth. The different scales of networks
are drawing interest for their potential modeling applications. With this research comes
the realization that LANs and WANs may be similar in construction and behavior, but
their possible differences require that the scale of the network in question be stated before
it is used for comparison, study, or discussion.
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3. Predictability and the Lack of Options in Network Design and in
Operating Systems
There are only a few topologies available for a network administrator when
creating a LAN or WAN. The possible arrangements of machines are limited by the
equipment in use and the purpose of the network. Along with limited topology is the
limited number of computer operating systems (OSs). The easily enumerable options in
topology and in operating systems leads to predictability in network constructions and
operation.
There are only four major topologies that exist for computer networks. LANs are
the best way to understand the topologies, but WANs follow the same principles, just on
a larger scale. The four topologies are: bus, ring, star, and tree. Bus networks have all
the machines connected to the same wire and are the most basic networks. Every
message sent on the wire is seen by all other machines. A ring topology is similar to a
bus except that the wire that connects the machines loops back on itself to form a ring.
Ring is useful for applications where two loops are laid in close proximity to one another
for redundancy. Star networks have computers all connected to a central piece of
hardware such as router or a switch. Routers and switches allow the network to be
segmented and provide more options to the designer. Tree networks have shared
connections to a main data source like a bus network, but subnetworks branch off of the
main source like the branches of a tree, hence the term “tree network.” Mesh networks
are a final topology that is not one of the major topologies, but may well be in the near
future. Mesh networks have come into the spotlight with the growth of wireless
networking. In a mesh network, every computer is connected to every other computer.
All computer networks follow one these topologies or a combination of them. Figure 3
depicts the different topologies.
26
Figure 3. Basic Network Topologies
The final component of the predictability in computer networks is that there are a
limited number of operating systems for the individual machines on the network. The
most prevalent and common OS is Microsoft Windows. Significant, but not as prevalent
are Apple’s Mac operating system, as well as UNIX and its derivatives such as Linux,
BSD, and Sun’s Solaris. Other specialized operating systems Ss exist but are only used
for special purposes and are insignificant in number when compared to the systems
already mentioned. Each OS has its own “fingerprints” and patterns in the way it
functions. How data is stored, written, transmitted, etc. can frequently be used to
determine the type of OS in use. This is useful for network operations because it allows
administrators to remotely work with different OSs and different machines, even if they
have never actually seen the computer in question. However, the enumerable nature of
OSs also limits the possibilities facing hackers and can make attacking a computer an
easier proposition.
C. NETWORK SECURITY
The challenge of network security is that the extreme openness and predictability
necessary for computer networks to operate efficiently works directly against the desire
to keep network operations secure. The more that is known about network operations,
the greater the likelihood that an attack will be successful. The protocols and systems
developed as networks matured are not designed to stop hackers. There are many places
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where the network assumes that commands and instructions are given by trusted
personnel and does not check the authenticity of the user issuing commands. The
openness that allows networks to function represents their major vulnerability.
1. Risk Management
If the way in which LANs and WANs communicate must be known to ensure
reliability and functionality, then the goal of network security cannot be absolute security.
If it were, then no traffic would be allowed to pass on the network out of fear of a
possible attack. There is a spectrum of protection that has absolute security on one end
(no traffic is allowed to pass), or on the other end, a total lack of security (allowing users
and computers to do anything they choose). The goal is risk management and to
minimize the risk as much as possible while still allowing the network to function while
not exceeding other constraints such as budget and manpower. There is a difference
between risk management and risk elimination. In her guide to gaining a network
security certification, Shon Harris explains why network security’s core is risk
management:
Information Risk management (IRM) is the process of identifying and
assessing risk, reducing it to an acceptable level, and implementing the
right mechanism to maintain that level. There is no such thing as a 100
percent secure environment. Every environment has vulnerabilities and
threats to a certain degree. The skill is in identifying these threats,
assessing the probability of them actually occurring and the damage they
could cause, and then taking the right steps to reduce the overall level of
risk in the environment to what the organization defines as acceptable
(Harris, 65).
2. The Strategy of Network Security and the CIAA Framework
Network security and information assurance in general, are centered on a core
framework that ensures the protection of the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and
authenticity (CIAA) of information. These four pillars are often referred to as the CIAA
model or framework, and the same convention will be used here. Every effort in network
security will attempt to protect at least one of the components of the CIAA framework.
Confidentiality is the “assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized
entities or processes” (DOD 8500.1, 18). Confidentiality in a network is normally
provided by encryption to prevent malicious or accidental observation. Cryptography is
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very complex and involved, but it for this paper it is enough to know that it works based
on shared secrets such as keys or passwords. The key or password is used to transform
the data into a scrambled and unreadable format for transmission. Once received, the
shared secret or another prearranged method for reversing the original encryption is used
to transform the scrambled data back into something meaningful.
Integrity is “…protection against unauthorized modification or destruction of
information” (DOD 8500.1, 21). Integrity is implemented in computer networks by
various means that involve calculations that cannot be reversed (known as “hashing”) or
by performing some calculation that can be compared by the receiver against the same
calculation performed by the sender (known as a “checksum” or “bit checking”). These
two methods allow the receiver to check his data against the sender’s to ensure that
nothing has been changed in transit.
Availability is “timely, reliable access to data and information services for
authorized users” (DOD 8500.1, 17). Risk management ensures availability by using
redundancy in design and operation and by using robust equipment. Managing networks
can be a simple proposition for a small business or an incredibly complex one for larger,
global organizations. Either way, if the network is unavailable any business, money is
lost. Network operations are supported by back up sites, secondary systems, and other
methods to avoid a failure preventing network access.
The final component of the model is the guarantee of authenticity. Authenticity is
“establish[ing] the validity of a transmission, message, or originator, or a means of
verifying an individual's authorization to receive specific categories of information’
(DOD 8500.1, 17). Authenticity and authentication have a reactive role to stopping
unauthorized personnel from gaining access to the network. Authenticity’s proactive role
is to ensure that information received is actually from the stated sender, and more simply,
that the person on the other end of a connection on the network is who they say they are.
Like Confidentiality, Authenticity is also protected with shared secrets and limited
access. If a user is able to access certain resources, such as network assets, they are
assumed to be authorized. In the same way, if they know the shared secret, such as a
password or pin, they are authorized access.
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CIAA is the backbone of network security. Every measure taken to protect the
network is designed to protect one or more of the components of the CIAA framework.
CIAA allows for a more detailed approach to risk management and helps to focus the
efforts of network administrators.
3. The Three States of Information and What must be Secured
The protection of information on a network is the purpose of the CIAA
framework. However, information can exist in three different states: processing, storage,
and transit (Mairs, 127). Each state requires the protection of the CIAA. The state of the
information and the particular threat for that stage will drive the security measures
enforced by the network administrators. The threats are quite different for each state and
can drive the budgets and security plans of an organization. The three states of
information will be revisited in the next chapter when they are applied to covert social
networks.
Information that is processing is normally being used by the computer.
Computers take information from memory as needed and return it to memory when the
necessary calculations are completed. Processing information must be protected because,
while it is being processed, it is in danger of being changed or damaged (Mairs, 127). As
the computer is reading the information out of memory, processing, and then writing it
back to memory, the data is in danger. If the computer were to lose power or suffer a
surge, the data it was processing and the memory locations that were being accessed will
certainly be lost or need repair.
Data that is secured in memory is subject to unauthorized access or damage due to
neglect, accidental overwriting, or component failure. Recent news reports about
potential identity theft from stolen laptops and from accidental exposure on websites are
timely examples of how stored data is often the most vulnerable state for information.
Stored data’s greatest vulnerability is the fact that humans easily forget the vast amounts
of information that they have processed. Computers are designed to remember well past
their own useful life. Systems with sensitive data may be exposed to threats because
users forget what is stored on the systems. Often, stored data is a prime target due to the
great return for hackers. For a simple analogy, it is a great deal easier, more efficient,
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and more profitable to take money from a vault than it is to rob every person using a
given ATM. The principle is the same for valuable data that is resting in storage.
Network security frequently focuses on information that is in transit. Information
in transit is protected using encryption or by using secure channels that have very limited
access. Network administrators are careful to ensure proper CIAA protections because
data in transit is the most informative in terms of detecting a network attack. A hacker
must move data on the network in order to achieve his objective. A virus must modify
data for it to wreak havoc. In both cases, the transmission and reception of data can tip a
network administrator that something is amiss. Additionally, the fact is that to hurt a
network you have to gain access to it. Firewalls and intrusion detection systems block
the majority of questionable incoming traffic before it can enter the network.
4. The Tactics of Network Security and How Networks are Secured
In a perfect world, computers would be designed from the ground up with CIAA
in mind and there would be no threat from malicious users. However, as software and the
protocols that are used to communicate were designed with a naïve belief that abuse was
not a factor, security analysts and network administrators have had to adapt their
thinking. Instead of secure computers, attention is now paid to creating a secure
environment for the relatively weak machines. This adaptation has created the concept of
the network perimeter.
The network perimeter is normally a logical division, but can also be physical or
geographical. The concept is akin to building a wall around the network to keep the
network safe and the hackers out. The network perimeter is where the bits in transit from
the previous section are scrutinized for their activity. This is normally done through the
use of firewalls and monitoring software. Firewalls that sit on the network perimeter
examine inbound and outbound traffic for pre-defined patterns or characteristics. Once
the traffic matches the programmed pattern, the firewall will block the traffic and can be
set to sound an alarm. Recent adaptations such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) have expanded the concept of a firewall to add
greater functionality.
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In addition to a secure perimeter, network security implements a defense-in-depth
(DID) approach with multiple layers of mutually supportive countermeasures. The
perimeter does well in controlling the majority of hacking attempts, viruses, and other
threats. However, if a threat does manage to penetrate the perimeter, there must be a way
to detect the threat, neutralize it, and repair the damage. This is where personal firewalls,
anti-virus, and anti-spyware factor into the equation. Each machine can be configured to
act for its own protection. If a hacker gets into the network, he will still have to bypass
additional security measures to do any damage to the machines. Furthermore, as each
computer can be configured to allow only that traffic which is necessary for it to perform
its assigned functions, the firewalls are normally more restrictive and quicker to alert if
something is out of the normal. The anti-virus and anti-spyware programs are the last
line of defense and scan the stored data on network computers to determine if an
infection has occurred. Newer programs will scan all incoming data to ensure that they
are not infected.
A final measure is logging network traffic and storing it for potential future use.
If a network breech is discovered, logs can be examined to determine when the breech
occurred and how it happened. This allows for a much more rapid repair of the network.
Without logs, network administrators would have no idea how the breech occurred and
would be forced to take the entire network down and start from scratch to be absolutely
certain that all traces were removed from the network. Arguably, the greatest reason to
log network traffic is to prosecute malicious users. Depending on how they are setup,
logs can pinpoint the necessary information to be admissible in court and lead to
convictions. There is also the added benefit of the psychological effect on users that
know their activities are being monitored.
These combined tactics and control measures reduce risk as much as possible
while still allowing the network to operate. However, the drawbacks are that they are
expensive and they can demand a lot of processing power from the network. A
compromise must be drawn between the protections necessary to keep the data safe and
the value of the data in question. If the network’s data is only worth $10,000, then it is
absurd to pay for a firewall and antivirus suite that costs more than $10,000. There is
hope that new operating systems like Microsoft’s Vista, that are designed from the
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beginning with security in mind, will put an end to the need for a network perimeter and
DID, but it is highly unlikely that it will ever happen. Hackers are smart and they are
motivated. New systems may stop old attacks, but the cat and mouse game will continue
and hackers will find a new way to compromise these systems and networks.
D. HACKING AND THE COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK (CNA)
METHODOLOGY
The press has generally characterized hackers as the pimple faced teen in a dark
room attempting to break into a bank’s mainframe to steal enough money for a new Play
Station 3. However, in reality many have simply taken the time to learn and explore
computers to the point that they understand how the systems work (Verton, 2002).
Although there are annual conventions where hackers meet to share their thoughts, there
is a lack of organization in the community.
As network security emerged as a standardized field, a model was created that
would explain the way that hackers penetrate a network. Although the origins are
unclear, a model has been adopted that maps the process of hacking from its beginnings
to exploitation. Here the model will be referred to as the Computer Network Attack
(CNA) Model. A series of books designed to educate network administrators entitled
Hacking Exposed has used the model since its first publication in 1999. Also, the
International Council of E-Commerce Consultants has incorporated the CNA model into






Each successive stage provides a greater amount of information to the hacker and
as the hacker knows more, he is able to do more damage and gain further access to
network resources. The model is also applied by legitimate businesses that specialize in
network security and testing, but instead of hacking it is termed “penetration testing” or
“pentest.” Either way, the model has provided the structure required to study CNA in a
systematic way. Each stage of the CNA model will be examined in detail.
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1. Stage 1 – Footprinting
Footprinting is the gathering of information on the target network. The
information gathered ranges from the address of the target to the range of Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses that are assigned to the target network by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority. This information is the most general, and footprinting is normally
passive. The target will not be probed in any way. The hacker uses publicly available
information to gather as much detail on the network as possible.
Footprinting is a painful and slow process that requires a great deal of patience
and perseverance. However, it is the first step because every bit of effort that is applied
to footprinting will pay dividends in the later stages. To explain by analogy, McClure,
Scambray, and Kurtz in their fifth edition of Hacking Exposed compare hacking to
robbing a bank,
For example, when thieves decide to rob a bank, they don’t just walk in
and start demanding money (not the smart ones, anyway). Instead, they
take great pains in gathering information about the bank-- the armored car
routes and delivery times, the video cameras, the number tellers, escape
exits, and anything else that will help in a successful misadventure. The
same requirement applies to successful attackers. They must harvest a
wealth of information to execute a focused and surgical attack (one that
won’t be readily caught). As a result, attackers will gather as much
information as possible about all aspects of an organization’s security
posture. Hackers end up with a unique footprint, or profile of their
target’s Internet, remote access, and intranet/extranet presence (6).
Footprinting uses public information as much as possible. Public databases are
queried for network addresses, names, phone numbers, domain names (such as
Google.com or Microsoft.com), and anything else that may be of use in later stages. It is
important to note that footprinting is still a passive effort. Later stages will increase the
visibility and the risk to the hacker, but during the first stage the hacker has done nothing
to expose himself to possible detection.
2. Stage 2 – Scanning
Scanning is the first offensive stage and represents the first risk of detection to the
hacker. Where footprinting passively gathered information about the network using
publicly available knowledge, scanning actively determines the network’s general
structure, potential targets, and running programs that may be vulnerable to exploitation.
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Again McClure writes that “If footprinting is the equivalent of casing the place for
information, then scanning is equivalent to knocking on the walls to find all the doors and
windows” (McClure, 42).
Automated tools will attempt to access different ports on the network. Using the
Hacking Exposed analogy, the tools will try every port on a system as if it were a door.
From the information gathered on the ports, educated guesses can be drawn as to what
services are running and what systems are in use. This is where the openness of
computer networking rears its head. Each operating system’s patterns are known and
those patterns can tell the hacker what kind of machine is on the other side of the network
connection. Each port that is open for traffic tells the hacker what kind of attack may be
beneficial in the next phase. For example, if a network scan returns that port 80 is open,
the scanned machine is most likely a web server and would be vulnerable to web server
attacks. It is not a fool-proof method, but it is quite accurate and produces reliable results
that require a minimum of tweaking.
Network scanning also gives the hacker a map of the network. Systems that
respond to the scans tell the hacker that they are up and running. The hacker is able to
map the network and the connections that exist between the machines. Again using well
known protocol information and known best practices for network setup, the hacker can
draw further conclusions about the functions of the machines. Some machines are more
valuable targets than others. Computers that are storing passwords or acting as a router
are good targets. Best practices and convention dictate that routers are always given the
first IP address in an IP space. In other words, when a hacker gets a reply to his scan
from a machine whose last digit is a one (e.g, 192.168.1.1) he can reasonably assume that
the machine is a router. Routers act as connectors in the network and are important to
mapping as well as further exploitation.
3. Stage 3 – Enumeration
Scanning tells the hacker what machines are listening on the network and what
potential services they are running. Enumeration verifies that the hacker’s theories about
services are correct. Now the hacker seeks to know exactly what versions,
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configurations, and security measures he is facing “…[hackers] typically turn next to
probing the identified services more fully for known weaknesses, a process we call
enumeration” (McClure, 78).
Hackers will use techniques to determine the exact versions of software that they
are facing. Each software version is slightly different from the previous version. New
versions are released due to improvements in the software, but they are also released due
to known security holes that need to be patched. If a hacker can tell which version of a
software package is in use, he can search for security holes to exploit.
In enumeration, networks begin to lose private information. Scanning is an active
attack on the network, but it does not directly aim to gather information on people or the
data stored on the network. Scanning learns about the computers. Enumeration aims to
learn more about the running systems and the human-machine interface. User names, the
probable location of password files and the exact location of sensitive data are probable
returns for the hacker during enumeration.
Enumeration is most effective when network administrators do not properly
configure their systems. Often when connecting to different machines or services,
extraneous information is given away. Network security battles this with the Principle of
Least Privilege or POLP, and it basically states that users only need as much information
as necessary to complete their tasking, no more, no less. However, in a network with
hundreds or thousands of machines, it is easy to forget to sanitize the extra information.
4. Stage 4 – Exploitation
Exploitation is the final stage of an attack. This is when all of the previous stages
come together allowing the hacker access to the network. Obviously, this is the worst
possible situation for a network. Any data that was protected has now been exposed.
Even more damaging than what was actually done to the network is the potential damage.
Administrators may not be able to determine the true extent of the hack and will be
forced to purge any system that the hacker may have had access to.
Exploitation relies on the hacker’s creativity to gain access to the computer
network. Although the network’s operations and configuration are known, the
penetration method and target selection are a matter of experience, skill, and desired
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outcome. Just as with destabilizing a covert network, exploitation in CNA is the point
where the systematic approach must pause for the inclusion of creativity. However, the
hacker basically has three avenues to pursue.
The most traditional exploitation is the system exploit. This is when the hacker
specifically targets a certain machine based upon its value or upon its poor security. If
the system is one that will guarantee great rewards, a hacker may focus on that machine
until a hole is found. Another approach is to look for the “low hanging fruit” and attack
those machines that have weak security or improper configurations. Once the weak
machine is penetrated, it can open the door to the harder machines. Whatever the case,
system exploitation works because the hacker determines what software is running and
then uses a known security flaw or a new flaw that he discovered. This is the reason that
network security focuses on software “patches” or code that fixes insecurity in the
original software. Microsoft uses what is known as “Patch Tuesday” to release new
patches for their operating systems and other software.
Another approach to exploitation is to attack the network traffic. A hacker will
watch network traffic to determine who is talking and what they are talking about. Once
the network session is identified, the hacker will carefully pick his time, jump in the
middle of the session performing a “session hijack.” Session hijacking is dangerous
because the hacker appears to be an authorized host, and there is no need for the hacker to
authenticate himself (Whitaker & Newman, 127). Once the session is hijacked, the
hacker impersonates both ends of the session to the other. This is known as a “man-in-
the-middle” attack and allows the hacker to see every piece of data transferred between
the two machines.
The last form of exploitation is attacking the user. Attacking the user allows a
hacker to skip the three previous stages and jump right to exploitation. There are
multiple ways to attack a system user. The most common is to trick the user into opening
a file or an email attachment that contains a malicious program. These programs are
called “Trojan horses” or “worms.” There are subtle differences between a virus, a
worm, and a Trojan horse, but they all aim to attack the user to gain access. The more
skillful approach is to attack the user with a technique called “social engineering.” Social
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engineering is “the act of tricking another person into providing confidential information
by posing as an individual who is authorized to receive the information” (Harris, 967).
Using social engineering, a hacker will call a user and pretend to be from the Information
Technology (IT) department at the business. He will attempt to say the right things to
fool the user into giving up their password or other sensitive data. Social engineering is a
skill that takes practice and a little bit of knowledge, but it can pay great dividends.
E. CONCLUSION
CNA, network security, and computer networks have lead an iterative process of
growth and change. The nature of computer networks drove the need for security to stop
hackers. Hackers find holes in the systems and necessitate changing security tactics and
modifications to the computer networks function. The three components are constantly
changing and adapting to keep the balance of security and functionality. The CNA
Model is the result of this give-and-take.
With a clear understanding of the CNA model, it is now possible to compare
computer networks and social networks. The validity of using CNA as a framework for
the SNA of covert networks will be examined to determine if the CNA model can
improve the SNA process.
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IV. HACKING A SOCIAL NETWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
Up to this point, social networks and Social Network Analysis (SNA) have been
introduced and examined. The shortfalls of SNA when applied against covert social
networks were made apparent. Computer networks, computer network security, and the
Computer Network Attack (CNA) model were covered in chapter two. The necessary
background information has been covered to address the purpose of this paper: to
determine if the CNA model can improve SNA when applied to a covert social network,
and how applicable the model is to destabilizing a covert social network.
This chapter will examine how computer networks and social networks compare
to one another. They are alike in just as many ways as they differ, but the differences are
great enough that the CNA model can only be used as a general, strategic guide for
destabilization instead of a tactical aid to exploitation. Finally, the CNA model will be
examined to demonstrate its potential for improving the defeat of covert networks, and
the model will be applied to SNA to demonstrate how it can be used to integrate SNA
into an offensive attack against covert networks.
B. COVERT SOCIAL NETWORKS AND COMPUTER NETWORKS
COMPARED
1. Similarities
With either covert social networks or computer networks the focus of interest is
on the network as a whole instead of the people or machines that compose the network.
We recall that SNA was developed to study the connections between people instead of
studying the people who have connections. Computer networks are studied in the same
way. The focus is not on the machines themselves, but on the network in its aggregate.
The focus on connections is a basic premise shared by the separate fields. These
fundamental frames-of-reference also created the same focus on network metrics. For
social networks, metrics include such things as centrality, transitivity, and prestige. For
computer networks, metrics examine network data such as throughput, latency, and loss.
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For either social networks or computer networks, the metrics used to understand the
network are not based on the nodes of the network, but are measurements of how the
network interacts with the node.
However, probably the most obvious similarity between computer and covert
networks is the fact that both share a network structure. Both computer and social
networks are characterized by the interconnection of nodes that share a common
relationship of some kind. The nodes in question are of relatively equal rank. For
computer networks, nodes are connected by the need to share information or by the need
to use shared resources like printing or Internet access. Covert social network
relationships are also connected to share information. All interconnection is to share
information at some level, regardless of the relationship, and a terrorist’s ties to his
family, friends, or other terrorists exist out of the need or desire to share information. As
for the need for a shared resource such as printing or Internet access in a computer
network, a simple example for a terrorist network is access to a bomb maker. The bomb
maker is a resource that the other members of the network require access to and it creates
a need for interconnection.
To examine the shared structure even further, covert networks can be examined
using the topologies of computer networks. The most common structure that is
encountered by counter-terrorist forces is the cellular structure that is used by
experienced groups to avoid detection and/or minimize damage if members are captured.
For a computer network, the cellular structure is identical to a tree topology with star
subnetworks. The main line is connected to the central machine and the central machines
have other computers connected to it. This is the same as the independent cell that has a
single leader with anonymous access in some way to the group’s leadership and planning.
The terrorist cells are small and compact with limited connections between members.
However, imagine the opposite structure where all network members are interconnected
to other members. This is the same as the mesh topology that is now becoming more
commonplace in wireless networks. Certainly, terrorists do not use a mesh topology due
to the fact that the capture of even one network node would present a grave security
problem, but the illustration is effective in proving that the methods used to describe the
structure of computer networks can be applied to covert social networks.
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Another way to compare the two networks is by using the general divisions of
Local Area Network (LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN) used in computer networks.
The small cells of terrorists connected with the fewest possible number of connections
forming a dyad, triad, or a subgroup is an ideal parallel to a LAN. Additionally, with a
LAN there is normally a central management that coordinates and directs, and this is the
cell leader in the case of a covert network. Pulling back to examine the cell in the larger
organization of the entire terrorist social network creates the interconnection of multiple
LANs and is the textbook definition of a WAN in computer networks. Just as the
distinction between a LAN and WAN is important to understanding computer network
behavior, the division is also important if applying the concept to covert networks.
WANs are characterized by a loose management and less restrictive policies that tend to
serve as guidelines instead of directives. The covert network example is that Al Qaeda
may issue a statement to their operatives that they should attempt to incite factional
violence, but their statement will only serve as a suggestion to the cell leader in Iraq as
enforcement is impossible due to the distance between the Al Qaeda leadership and Iraq.
The LAN, or cell, will enact their own polices and procedures that are much more
restrictive due to the proximity to the cell members.
Covert networks cannot eliminate risk and must practice risk management using
the same rationale as computer network security. Covert networks must operate with
accepted risk. Terrorists cannot eliminate the forces that are working against them. To
remove all risk would require the killing or neutralization of all government forces or a
complete cessation of all illegal activity. Although the elimination of all government
forces would be ideal for a terrorist, it is obviously impossible. Likewise, ceasing attacks
and laying down arms is not an option if the group is to attain its objectives through
violence. The result is a need to operate with some assumed risk and minimize the
likelihood of exposure, capture, and death to the point that the covert network can operate
and still achieve their goals. The security models for computer networks differ from
covert networks, but the shared characteristic is that both networks function in a threat
environment that requires security to be an integral part of operations.
Communications in a covert network can be synchronous or asynchronous. When
communicating in a covert network, options include face to face meetings, dead drops,
42
couriers, runners, phone calls, email, web pages, etc. Some of these methods are
synchronous (phones and meetings) and others are asynchronous (dead drops, email,
runners, web pages). When talking in person or on the phone, the timing required to
carry on a two-way, simultaneous conversation is done automatically as long as one
person doesn’t interrupt or talk over the other person. When communicating using
asynchronous methods, there is no need to coordinate as one person sends their message
and waits for the return like a tennis match.
For a terrorist, asynchronous messages are safer than synchronous because they
reduce the risk of detection, but they also come with the drawback that a reply message
may come almost instantly or never at all; this makes planning and coordination difficult.
A danger is both parties in the communication creating their own understanding of what
was being said. One message may say, “Attack at noon,” and the next message may say,
“Change attack to 1230.” An asynchronous communication would leave both sides in
confusion until some type of acknowledgement was received that the attack time was
changed and that all players are working from the same plan. This demonstrates why
asynchronous communications are used for simple orders or issues that are not time
critical. Synchronous communications are used when planning an operation, clarifying
important details, or in the final phases of an operation to ensure that all actors are
properly coordinated. Knowing the two forms of communication can be useful for
determining the likelihood of an attack, but it comes with the caveat that it is
unpredictable. Understanding the difference in synchronous and asynchronous
communications can help the network analyst determine that a change in the covert
network is occurring, but the reason for the change and what it means to friendly forces is
something that would be determined by other means.
Information in a covert network can be in one of the three states outlined in the
computer networks chapter: processing, storage, or transit. Information that is
processing is being used by the group to achieve its mission. It is information that is
important to the group in the immediate present. For example, if a cell is waiting in
ambush for a target, the processing information is the tasks and roles that each member of
the cell is to perform when the ambush occurs. When the signal is given, the processing
information is acted upon and more information begins processing, such as their escape
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plan. Stored information is that information that is known to the terrorist, but is not being
used. The location of the safe house, the members of the cell, and their normal
communications methods are examples. Information that is in transit is communication
that carries current and time sensitive instructions or details. Using the previous ambush
example, the information in transit is the order to execute the ambush.
For friendly forces fighting a covert network, information in transit and
information in storage are the two most important. This is the same for computer
networks. Information in transit is paid the most attention in computer networks because
it can indicate an attack is ongoing or is imminent. The same is true for a covert network.
The frequent reports of “increased activity” or “increased chatter” that the DOD uses to
raise the terror threat warnings are proof that information in transit is an important
indicator of covert network activity. Stored information is important to tracking,
mapping, and neutralizing a covert network. Capturing a cell member and using his
stored information allows friendly forces to determine the necessary details to continue
their efforts at stopping the network.
The final similarity between the two networks is one of strategy. Computer
networks and covert social networks function on the Principle of Least Privilege (POLP)
mentioned in the previous chapter. POLP is frequently encountered in another
expression, “need to know.” Covert networks survive based on maintaining a “need to
know” concept of operations. There is a strict compartmentalization of the network’s
members and only those that need to know information are given access. POLP is used
by computer network administrators to keep hackers from gaining information that is
potentially damaging.
2. Differences
First and foremost, the openness and standardization of computer networks is
absent in covert networks. Covert networks have a standard way that they communicate,
but it is not known openly. What is more, the standard means of communication can be
quickly changed in the event of a security breech. Covert networks intertwine obscurity
into every aspect of their operations. The two networks have opposite requirements for
longevity. To remain a functioning network, a computer network must maintain
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predictable operations and a predictable configuration. If a covert network becomes
predictable, it increases its risk. Therefore a covert network seeks to maintain secrecy at
all times for its own protection.
The strategic approach of the Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication, and
Availability (CIAA) Framework used to protect computer networks is replaced by trust in
covert networks. Computer networks itemize the characteristics of information that must
be protected to ensure a secure operating environment. Covert networks do not itemize,
but instead take a general approach that is all encompassing. Confidentiality is protected
through trusted couriers carrying messages, or basic code words and other simple
methods, which are only known to trusted contacts to prevent observation. Authenticity
is protected by only using the trusted members of the network or other contacts that are
vetted by those that are already trusted. Integrity must rely on trusted couriers or direct
contact to prevent the alternation of communication information. Finally, the availability
of network access is not protected by trust, but is protected using tradecraft such as
frequent relocation, redundant communication channels, and other measures (Sageman,
2004 and Arquilla, 2001). Covert networks benefit from their simplicity when compared
to even the smallest LAN and are able to operate securely using a less scientific or
dogmatic approach.
Covert networks use compartmentalization to protect an ambiguous network
perimeter. Computer networks may also suffer from borders that are confused and
shifting, but compared to the challenges outlined in SNA in creating a perimeter for
social networks, they are much more obvious for computers. The use of firewalls and a
defense-in-depth approach of computer networks centralize resources behind a curtain of
protection. This is infeasible for covert networks and they are forced to rely on alternate
means. They distribute manpower, resources, and knowledge as much as possible to
minimize damage in the event of a compromise. Covert networks cannot build a wall
around their network to protect it like a computer network does as a part of standard
practice. This is one of the reasons that covert networks are hard to fix and finish. The
sacrifice for the covert network is that communications suffer from speed and reliability
problems.
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There are no governing or regulating bodies that dictate the inner-workings of a
covert network. There is nothing similar to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA) in computer networks that instructs a covert network how to carry on
communications or what protocols should be used to share information. The closest that
a covert network may get would be a training division that attempts to standardize the
network’s operations. The lack of standardization creates a learning curve for new
network members and for law enforcement attempting to penetrate a network. Although
there are general trends that are common to covert networks and they often respond in
typical ways when pressured by law enforcement, it cannot be assumed that they are
enough alike to not require independent study. Each cell or group may function
differently and necessitates a lengthy process of study to understand the intricacies of the
group. The positive of this lack of standardization is that it also forces the covert network
to rely on simple methods that change infrequently. Attempting to modify the network’s
method of operations or communications is not an easy task and must be done slowly and
carefully to transfer all of the network’s members to the new system. With computer
networks, the IANA can release a new regulation and every computer wishing to connect
to the Internet knows what is expected and how to meet the regulation. The lack of
regulation is a double edged sword.
Finally, along with a lack of regulation and standardization comes the lack of a
unified terrorist topology or standard operating procedure. Where there are only a few
options for operating systems in computer networks that can focus an attempted attack
and make the selection of exploitation method a simpler affair, there are no parallels in a
covert network. Each terrorist, cell, and group is different. They follow common trends
and generally organize along the same lines, but there are no guarantees. This creates a
challenge for the analyst attempting to destabilize a covert network. The creativity
needed by the hacker when exploiting a computer network was at least bounded by the
limited possibilities in computer network configuration. This is again a double edge
sword as the bounds that limit a hacker’s ability to find a way to exploit the network do
not exist for an analyst attacking a covert network.
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3. How They Compare
The similarities and differences are marked between computer and covert social
networks. The direct similarities in security, risk, structure, information sharing, and
outsider threats allow the application of the CNA model to a covert social network
without drastic modification. However, it is clear that the lack of predictability,
standardization, and regulation force the CNA model to remain at the strategic level
functioning as a guide to exploiting a covert social network. The CNA model applies to
the general process of destabilization. Attempting to take the model down to a more
granular approach causes it to fail. For example, the CNA model for computer networks
uses automated programs to scan computers on the network for open ports. Covert
networks do not have open ports that are assigned by standardizing bodies, and therefore,
there are no automated programs to scan a covert network. The CNA model can be used
in destabilizing a covert social network, but only when it is used to organize SNA into a
systematic, phased approach. The CNA model cannot be used as a direct comparison of
hacking a computer network to destabilizing a covert network because of the differences
between the networks.
C. APPLICATION OF THE CNA MODEL
1. The Validity of the CNA Model
When applying the CNA model to SNA, the primary purpose is to supplement the
SNA process using a systematic approach in order to reduce errors and increase
confidence in destabilization strategies. SNA alone is useful and can possibly help the
forces battling a covert network gain a deeper understanding of the network and may
provide insights as to the best way to bring the network down. However, as was
discussed at length in the SNA chapter, the absence of a standardized approach to
conducting SNA creates opportunities for mistakes and faulty assumptions.
It is clear that the CNA model can be applied as a general aid to destabilizing
covert social networks, but the question remains if it will really help reduce the inherent
error in analyzing a covert social network. It is feasible to take a given social network
and conduct two different network analyses, one without applying the CNA model and
one with the model, and then compare the results. However, the volatility of social
networks prevents such a comparison yielding any reliable results.
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The difficulties SNA faces when applied to a covert network may be minimized
when the process is standardized. Although untested, it is reasonable to assume that the
standardization of SNA will improve accuracy due to the possibility of adding peer
review and by limiting assumptions. Each phase can be limited by a confidence level that
prevents further planning until that level is achieved. For example, an operation to
capture a wanted terrorist can be held until the analyst employing the CNA model can
produce a 90% confidence level that the person in question is the right target for the right
reasons. Although subjective, it does provide a chance to review the process at each
phase.
Additionally, at the conclusion of each phase, the assumptions made during the
analysis can be itemized for peer review. Any underlying assumptions can be
challenged, and by bringing them to light, the analysis can be further improved. SNA
tells the analyst nothing about the network. SNA only presents a matrix or a graph that
attempts to model the network’s relationships. Every value or characteristic assigned to
the social network is based on the interpretation of the analyst. Interpretation of
something as complex as a social network creates a high probability for faulty
assumptions. It is necessary to challenge these assumptions to improve SNA and to take
SNA towards an offensive tool instead of a descriptive one. To provide an example of
challenge assumptions, targeting a node because it is the most central to the network
assumes that the node is critical to the operation of the network and it also carries an
underlying assumption that centrality is the network characteristic that deserves to be
targeted. Peer review by other analysts or decision makers can examine the first
assumption that the node is critical to network operation and the second assumption that
centrality is the right criteria to choose for destabilization. This peer review should
increase the accuracy and confidence in destabilization efforts.
The chapter on SNA concluded that the challenges of applying SNA to covert
networks cannot be completely overcome due to inherent data errors. If the data cannot
be improved, then to increase confidence levels in network analysis, the process that is
used to examine the data must be improved. The CNA model provides an excellent
starting point for improving SNA.
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2. Application
Computer networks and social networks are similar enough to apply the CNA
model, and it is reasonable to believe that the CNA model is qualitatively valid, so the
final question that remains is how the model can be applied to destabilize a covert social
network. Before the model is applied, a change in mindset may be required by a network
analyst. SNA methods and techniques were created to support the academic study of
open networks. However, to attack and destabilize a social network using the CNA
model, the analyst must move from the academic mindset to an offensive mindset that is
aimed entirely at exploiting the social network. SNA is a descriptive tool, and ideally,
the use of the CNA model can improve the offensive capabilities of SNA when applied to
covert networks. Not only can CNA provide structure for the analyst and increase the
confidence levels of destabilization strategies, it can also help to guide the analyst
towards the aggressive and offensive mindset necessary to topple a hardened covert
network.
The analyst must become a social network hacker. The analyst must also
recognize that the goal at the beginning of a destabilization effort should not be to topple
the entire network in a single action. The goal is to find a foothold for exploitation.
Once the foothold is secured, the CNA model can be applied repeatedly to hopefully lead
to the eventual destabilization of the covert network. Theoretically, little by little, the
network can be toppled, but attempting to do it from the outset focuses on the forest
instead of the trees. Actually bringing the network down will depend on a great number
of factors, but beginning a destabilization using smaller maneuvers with a cumulative
effect should increase the predictability of the results and provide a controlled approach.
The destabilization results of applying the CNA model to a covert social network
will surely vary depending on a multitude of factors such as the skill of the analyst,
available information, and the objectives of the analysis effort. What can be stated with
certainty is that applying the CNA model to a covert social network will not be as
successful as applying it to a computer network. The differences in complexity and
predictability between computer networks and social networks prevent correlated results.
The CNA model points directly to the holes in a computer network, but when used to
attack a social network, it merely provides structure and standardization to SNA. When
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the CNA model is applied to a computer network, any vulnerability in the network will
emerge as a hacker progresses through each of the four stages. This is not necessarily
true when the model is applied to a social network. The analyst will still have to
determine where to attack the network instead relying on a program that finds the
network’s weaknesses. Social networks are more complex than a simple port being open
or an improperly secured computer service. The CNA model is designed to filter out
vulnerabilities in comparably simple computer networks. Unlike computer networks,
there is no guarantee that the CNA model will find any of the vulnerabilities in a covert
social network. This is a limitation of the CNA model when it is applied to covert
networks and it is a point that must be remembered by the analyst.
One of the benefits of applying the CNA model is that its phased approach
marries well with the phased planning done by the military. The staged process that the
CNA model uses is ideal for incorporation into the Joint Planning and Execution System
(JOPES) or Military-Decision Making Process (MDMP). Both of these planning
processes use a multi-phase approach to move from initial planning to the final stages and
clean up of a military operation. Each stage of the CNA model can match the phases of
military planning.
To further demonstrate the application of the CNA model, each phase will be
examined in detail with possible arrangements of how the model can assist in the
application of SNA against a covert network.
a. Footprinting
When applied against a covert social network, footprinting is the
collection of open source information and closed source intelligence about the network
and its likely operations. The analyst uses news reports, public records, the Internet,
intelligence reports, and any other sources of information to gain a tentative picture of the
network. In the first stage, the data can be of questionable veracity or from unreliable
sources. The idea is to gather everything and anything possible to prepare for the
following stages where it will be examined for quality.
After the data is collected, the analyst sorts through the information and
attempts to determine a basic understanding about the network. This is the “rough draft”
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of the SNA process that will be updated and changed. The likely topologies for the
network are examined and key players are identified. Footprinting requires the analyst to
make assumptions about these network members and the organization of the network as a
whole. Each assumption can be analyzed to ensure that it is reasonable and also help
identify missing information that is required to verify or dismiss the assumption.
Assessments on network metrics such as centrality are not measured, but are at a
minimum, starting to show themselves to the analyst. Initial projections and
destabilization strategies can be presented, but attempting to plan anything this early in
the process would be a waste of resources as the initial understanding of the network may
reflect very little about the actual organization.
b. Scanning
Scanning a covert network, just like a computer network, is the first active
phase in the attack on the network. The objective of the scanning phase is to start
eliminating some of the assumptions from the footprinting stage, improve the projected
network model for topology and personnel, and begin active collection of new
intelligence. Scanning is the first active phase because new intelligence must be
collected to determine how the dated facts used to in footprinting actually reflects the
current network. The dynamic nature of covert networks requires continual intelligence
to maintain network models with as little error as possible. Scanning is the beginning of
the intelligence collection. Initial projections for network metrics can be generated as
well as tentative destabilization strategies. The metrics and strategies will have low
confidence levels until the data is further analyzed, but scanning represents the first time
that the analyst can reasonably determine what the network looks like and how it
operates. This is the information that is required to give commanders options to topple a
network.
c. Enumeration
Enumeration incorporates the cornerstones of SNA. The data collected in
footprinting and updated in scanning is used to apply SNA metrics and analysis tools.
The data is combined into sociomatrices and sociograms. The frame of reference for the
analysis is finalized and determines the number of modes, the coding schemes, and the
network boundary. Network metrics are measured and their validity is the highest it will
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ever be. Any previous assumptions are revisited and dismissed, or are noted for inclusion
in the final confidence level calculation.
Enumeration is concerned with pattern detection. The first of the two
pillars of SNA emerges when the data is fully examined for the first time. The previous
two stages projected the topology and network roles and relationships, but enumeration
specifically addresses these network characteristics to provide the definitive projection
with as little error as possible. Enumeration focuses on who is connected to whom.
Again, this may require assumptions on the part of the analyst, but each assumption can
be listed and can reference the supporting evidence for each one. These assumptions can
be examined by analysts or superiors not involved in the network analysis to determine if
they are logical and reasonable.
d. Exploitation
This is the stage that requires the most skill and creativity from the
analyst. The strategies outlined in the SNA chapter of nodal removal and nodal
manipulation must be used against the correct node. The choice of destabilization tactic
is situation dependant and incorporates the uncertainty of the previous stages in the CNA
model. Accuracy is vital and is the reason that each preceding stage must contain as few
errors or unqualified assumptions as possible as their effects are cumulative.
Exploitation begins with pattern interpretation and ends with the offensive
measure used to destabilize the network. Exploiting a covert network requires the analyst
to interpret the patterns detected during enumeration to find the weakness that will
provide the foothold for further exploitation. Once the causes of the organization of
relationships are determined in the network, the analyst is able to predict the first-order
effects on the network with a reasonable level of certainty.
Targeting is an important component of exploitation. There are two
options. The first is to let the network analysis determine the targeted node. This has the
advantage of allowing the analyst to use creativity to create the optimal destabilization
plan by choosing the nodes that will cause the greatest damage, or choosing nodes that
will lead to follow-on attacks that will create the greatest damage. The second option for
targeting in exploitation is to already have the node targeted and then determine the
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network’s response. Instead of focusing on the network and how to destabilize it, the
focus in on the node and what the loss will mean to network operations. The model can
be used to determine network effects, assuming that footprinting, scanning, and
enumeration are all complete. An example would be an order to capture a High-Value
Target (HVT) from a higher authority. The analyst would be able to provide reasonable
predictions, at least first order effects, on how the network would respond to the removal
of the HVT. Another example would be a chance killing of a network node and
determining how the network will respond.
The exploitation stage is the final step in a long chain of careful analysis,
and the model cannot be used out of order. Users of SNA may wish to rush into
exploitation without an appreciation of the buildup that is necessary. There must be an
understanding of how the network functions and why it functions as it does. Without this
understanding, selecting a target for removal or manipulation will produce unpredictable
results and may do more damage than good. The CNA model provides a form of a cost-
benefit analysis. Commanders must at least know the price that they potentially pay for
independent targeting. The analyst is able to provide reasonable conclusions about what
the network may do in response to an offensive action. The bottom line is that when the
CNA model applied to SNA, each stage allows for a chance to pause and examine the
assumptions made or assumptions dismissed—ensuring that the process produced the
highest confidence level possible.
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V. CONCLUSION
A. REVISITING THE OBJECTIVE
The objective of this paper was to determine if the Computer Network Attack
(CNA) model can improve the use Social Network Analysis (SNA) against a covert
social network. The conclusion is that the CNA model is applicable to covert network
and it is reasonable to believe that it will reduce error in conducting SNA. Computer
networks and social networks share enough similarities that the CNA model can be
applied as a strategic guide to destabilization without major modifications to the model.
Ideally, the integrated process outlined in the final chapter which intertwines the current
approach to SNA with the CNA model would be used by forces battling a covert network
and desiring to increase the confidence levels in their predictions. With the recent
incorporation of SNA into military doctrine, SNA it its present form will certainly have
to be modified to meet the needs of the military user engaged in offensive operations.
Unfortunately, it will never be the predictive tool that can definitively lead to the
destruction of a covert network. That being said, the CNA model is the perfect beginning
of the expanded use of SNA as an analysis tool, and it has a future in standardizing and
improving the process of exploiting a covert network.
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The following areas are starting points for future research based on this paper:
 Apply the CNA model to an actual covert network and specifically
propose how the model can destabilize the network.
 There exists the possibility for a final stage to be added to the CNA model
after exploitation to handle feedback and model correction.
 Write an annex to the new counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, that
details how the CNA model can be added to current doctrine.
 Parallel the CNA model and covert network exploitation with the staged
military planning found in the Joint Planning and Execution System
(JOPES) or Military-Decision Making Process (MDMP).
 Further refine the model with expanded input from computer scientists,
network administrators, sociologists, and military or law enforcement
personnel that have experience using SNA against covert networks.
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